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ABSTRACT One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree
to which political outcomes can be in uenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest
group strategies in particular institutions—legislative, administrative, and legal—is extensive,
there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions
affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the
opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of
competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity,
we develop a number of important insights about each stage that cannot be observed by examining
each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court,
and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, (1) as courts become more biased
toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated
all together, (2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and (3) as the
responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends
on the underlying ideology of the court.
1. Introduction
Interest groups frequently lobby regulators to obtain favorable policy outcomes.
There is a large body of scholarship that both theoretically and empirically
explores the implications of the American political institutiona l structure on the
strategies and tactics that interest groups employ to in uence institutiona l
outcomes.1 The rational choice literature outlines two primary mechanisms
interest groups have in the lobbying process. First, groups “buy policy” through
some form of resource transfers.2 Second, groups lobby policymakers by
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providing information so that policymakers can ensure the policy they choose is
close to their own preferences and those of their constituents.3
Unfortunately, none of these theories explicitly considers the effects that a
posterior strategy—the opportunity for groups to challenge legislative or rule-
making policy in court—has upon the strategies employed by groups or the
outcomes of legislation and rulemaking. Although a handful of authors has
examined how interest groups choose between legislation and litigation to obtain
favorable policy outcomes, these studies have limited their analysis to Congress
and the courts (omitting regulatory agencies),4 or have examined the role of
interest groups in affecting the composition of judges on, and cases before, the
court.5 As Olson points out, despite attempts to include interest-group litigation
as part of a full-blown theory of interest groups in all institutiona l arenas, in
most models the analysis stops at the legislative or rulemaking stage.6
A second literature, alternatively, considers litigation strategies as a means of
achieving policy outcomes. Riker and Weingast, McNollgast, McCubbins and
Schwartz, and Moe, among others, argue that administrative procedures and
rules of standing can be used by legislators to ensure that small groups can be
advantaged in administrative and legal settings.7 In doing so, Congress ensures
that one side does not monopolize the policymaking process. Similarly, the
positive literature on the courts outlines the process by which judges, modeled
as political actors, render decisions in accordance with their own preferences as
part of a larger inter- and intra-branch policymaking game.8 In these models,
however, the role of the interest group has been omitted.
A third perspective on litigation examines the role of disadvantaged groups.9
A number of legal scholars and political scientists have argued that litigation is
a recourse for groups who are politically weak in legislative or administrative
fora. Cortner, for example, argues that smaller groups “are highly dependent
upon the judicial process as a means of pursuing their policy interests, usually
because they are temporarily, or even permanently, disadvantaged in terms of
their abilities to attain successfully their goals in the electoral process, within
the elected political institutions or in the bureaucracy. If they are to succeed
at all in the pursuit of their goals they are almost compelled to resort to
litigation.”10 This literature, however, does not develop a theory of when such
strategies are likely to be effective. While they point to the importance (and even
dependence) of litigation to the policy process, there is scant theoretical work
which systematically explains variation in the availability and pursuit of such
strategies.
3. See, for example, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984); Lupia and McCubbins (1994); Banks and Weingast
(1992); Banks (1989); Austen-Smith (1993, 1995); Austen-Smith and Wright (1992, 1994); de Figueiredo,
Spiller and Urbiztondo (1999).
4. Rubin, Curran, and Curran (2001).
5. Caldeira and Wright (1998); McGuire and Caldeira (1993).
6. Olson (1990).
7. Riker and Weingast (1986); McNollgast (1987, 1989); McCubbins and Schwartz (1984); Moe (1989, 1991).
8. See, for example, Segal and Spaeth (1993); Segal (1997); Spiller and Gely (1992); Spiller and Spitzer (1992);
Cohen and Spitzer (1994); Tiller (1998); Tiller and Spiller (1999); Marks (1988); McNollgast (1994, 1997);
Cross and Tiller (1998); Epstein and Knight (1995).
9. For a summary, see Olson (1990); Epstein (1985).
10. Cortner (1968).
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Although these literatures—positive theories of lobbying, positive theories of
the courts, and theories of political disadvantages—contribute a great deal to our
understanding of how these strategies work by themselves, we view these as
partial equilibrium theories that focus only on the relationships between lobby-
ists and legislators, or regulators and the courts. Our work integrates these
perspectives by considering a model of lobbyists , regulators, and the courts
simultaneously . We ask how competing interest groups with differential re-
sources con gure their nonmarket spending over lobbying and litigation to
maximize the possibility of a favourable policy outcome. This potential second
stage of the  ght over policy may, in turn, affect how competing groups choose
the levels of their lobbying investments.
One way in which the lobbying and litigation strategies of groups is related
is that groups must choose how to allocate resources to the  rst stage lobbying
effort and then, should they or their opponent choose to litigate, to the
subsequent litigation that might ensue.11 This is the case because, as many legal
and political scholars have shown, outcomes in court are a function of the
resources that groups bring to bear in that forum. Galantner, for example,
argued that the “haves” should be advantaged in courts.12 While Wheeler,
Cartwright, Kagan and Friedman found little evidence for this hypothesis in
state supreme courts, in most cases, litigation cannot and does not reach
that level.13 Instead, in the lower courts, resource-intensive groups appear to
have the advantage. Olson, for example,  nds that empirically, large groups can
use federal district courts to “enforce gains” won in other fora.14 Similarly,
Songer and Sheehan  nd that in the United States Courts of Appeals “upperdog
litigants win much more frequently.”15 In a resource-constrained nonmarket
environment this suggests that there is interdependence in the choices for  rms,
groups, lobbyists , and public of cials between vote-buying in lobbying and
resources spent for litigation. We model the problem as a two-stage game. In the
 rst stage, competing groups must allocate resources to buy policy from a
regulator or agency. In the second stage, the loser in the  rst stage can choose
to litigate.16
11. Resource allocation has generally been discussed in the literature on lobbying alone, and usually in the context
of a collective action problem (Olson, 1965; Grier, Munger, and Roberts, 1994). One exception is de
Figueiredo and de Figueiredo (2002).
12. Galantner (1974).
13. Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan, and Friedman (1987).
14. Olson (1990).
15. Songer and Sheehan (1992).
16. Although we model the strategic interaction as a resource allocation problem, we do recognize that other
mechanisms governing the interaction might exist as well. For example, in certain cases, the printed record
from administrative lobbying has a privileged place in later adjudication, therefore implying there might
(almost certainly) be an informational aspect to the relationship between lobbying and litigation. In this paper,
however, we con ne ourselves to the resource and policy aspects. We do this for a number of reasons. First,
as noted above, a number of scholars have commented on the resource basis as being a prime dimension in
which the interaction is linked. To the extent that it is useful to explore the implications of this observation
more rigorously, the model is a useful device to do so. Second, given that vote-buying and rent-seeking has
been perhaps the dominant approach to modeling interest group lobbying of institutional actors, it is a natural
extension to what such assumptions imply when we examine an integrated policymaking process across a
set of sequentially linked institutions. Finally, since our interest is in using theory to identify an appropriate
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The primary contribution of our model is to explain the conditions under
which litigation threats affect lobbying outcomes and how that informs us about
the strategies employed by groups. This allows us to develop a number of
insights about the nature of “vote-buying” and in uence in agencies. Perhaps
most importantly, our model shows that the existence of litigation can have a
profound effect on lobbying. Under certain conditions , such as small differentials
in group resources or courts strongly predisposed toward the status quo, lobbying
will completely be eliminated. Under other conditions litigation threats can
actually drive policies towards traditionally advantaged groups in the rulemaking
stage.
This result has implications both for the political disadvantage theory and the
vote-buying literature. In the former case, the political disadvantage theory
requires two quali cations. On the one hand, the theory is too modest: the
existence of litigation not only gives smaller, politically disadvantaged groups a
strategic alternative in which to obtain policy outcomes more favorable to them,
but in many cases the mere threat of litigation changes policy outcomes at the
rulemaking stage itself. On the other hand, the exact nature of advantage
conferred to the “underdogs” at the lobbying stage depends on the character of
the courts. If, for example, the courts do not respond to the resources of groups,
outcomes at the lobbying stage might be more rather than less extreme. The
results of the model also allow us to better understand the nature of vote-buying
and in uence-peddling. Notably, the dependence of judicial outcomes, at least in
part, on the resources conserved at that stage, mean that lobbying and litigation
are partial substitute s. Money spent on one process detracts from outcomes of
the other process. This introduces a strategic (and global) allocation decision
between the two types of policymaking mechanisms.
Finally, the results of the model have important implications for the nonmar-
ket strategies of  rms. The existing literature on nonmarket strategy tracks the
interest group literature in emphasizing who and how  rms must in uence
regulation for non-market strategies.17 Our article contributes to this understand-
ing by pointing out that the availability of litigation means that, in many cases,
 rms should forego lobbying altogether to ensure that any gains they obtain can
be upheld and defended in the courts. As we explain in more detail below, the
model suggests a number of key points of a  rm’s nonmarket context—how
much it dislikes the status quo, the resources of its opponents, the ability to
forum shop at the litigation stage, the underlying predisposition of the courts to
existing policies—which will determine its best integrated lobbying–litigation
strategy.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop a simple model of
lobbying a regulator to use as a base case to analyze the effects of litigation on
policy-making. In Section 3, we allow litigation as a posterior process to
lobbying by expanding the model to include a resource-responsive court which
Footnote continued
speci cation for testing alternative hypotheses empirically, here we develop a model which provides testable
implications which can be compared to that in an informational model. We reserve both the modelling and
the testing of alternatives to other work.
17. See Baron (1994, 1999); Krehbiel (1998).
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favors the status quo or court’s reversion point probabilistically .18 Finally, in
Section 4, we offer a number of conclusions , including extensions of the model
to be explored.
2. A model of lobbying
We start by developing a simple vote-buying model to examine the effects
that additional institutiona l features might have on policy outcomes. When we
consider vote-buying, we do not limit ourselves to formally buying regulators’
votes through legal (campaign  nance) or illegal (bribery) means. Indeed, any
stock of money-metric resources which the lobbyist can transfer and which are
valued by (some) regulators, can be usefully represented by these vote-buying
models. This might include large budgets and facilities, subsidization of infor-
mation gathering, greater jurisdiction for the agency, future expected consulting
contracts, job prospects, and wealth.
The lobbying game has three players: a representative regulator or government
agency R, which is issuing orders, making rules, or implementing regulations;
and two interest groups or lobbyists, A and B. Each of the interest groups is
endowed with a stock of resources wi, iP {A, B}.
Each player has single-peaked preferences over policies in a unidimensiona l
policy space xPR, where a player’s utility is characterized by a maximum or
ideal point at xi iP {A, B, R}. The regulator’s utility function, is assumed to take
the form:
UR 5 2 u x u 1 y
where x is the policy that is implemented, and y is the total transfers which are
made to R. Notice that this speci cation of R’s utility function implies, without
loss of generality, that xR 5 0. The two interest group lobbyists each have utility
functions speci ed as follows:
Ui 5 2 u x 2 xiu iP {A, B}
Further, to create a tension between the interests of the lobbyists , we assume
xB , 0 , xA. Notice that this speci cation of preferences means that the lobbyists’
resources are such that they must either “use it or lose it:” they expend no costs
to transfer resources to R, and they do not retain any of these resources for
private consumption at the end of the game.19 Finally, we make some assump-
tions about the endowments of the lobbyists. In particular, we assume wi , u xiu
and wA $ wB. The former means that the budget constraint will always bind the
offers of the lobbyists . The latter simply means that one of the groups, in
particular A, has greater resources than the other.
The sequence of moves (summarized in Figure 1) is as follows. A and B
simultaneously announce an offer to R, which consists of a policy offer xoi and
a transfer yi # wi. After these announcements, R then chooses one of three
options. She can accept A’s offer, B’s offer, or neither, and implement a policy
anywhere in x. Finally, after R has chosen her action, policies are implemented
18. We restrict our attention here to the most interesting case, where the existing set of policies favors the smaller
group.
19. Leftover resources only means that the constraints are less binding and do not add much insight to the theory.
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FIGURE 1. Sequence of play in the lobbying game.
according to R’s choice, transfers are effected, payoffs are made, and the game
ends. A strategy for a lobbyist i, is a map si:(xi, xj, wi, wj) ® oi:(xoiPR, yi # wi),
for iP {A, B}, i Þ j and where oi denotes the policy-transfer pair offered by
i. Thus, a lobbyist’s strategy is simply his announcement that states his
take-it-or-leave-it offer to R of a transfer of yi, in exchange for the regulator’s
implementation of policy xoi. Similarly, a strategy for R is a map
sR:(oA, oB, xA, xB, yA, yB) ® xP {xoA, xoB, xPR}. In this case, R’s strategy is simply
a choice from the two offers made by A and B, or her refusal of both and
implementation of some other policy in the policy space x.
To  nd the equilibrium strategies of the players given the parameters of the
model, we use the concept of Nash subgame perfection. This means that every
player plays an optimal or expected utility maximizing strategy forward at each
point, given that they have reached that point.20 Given this solution concept, we
have the following proposition (all proofs are contained in the appendix):
PROPOSITION 1. The following constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to
the lobbying game:
i. sA:(xAo* 5 wA 2 wB, y*A 5 wA)
ii. sB:(xBo* 5 0, y*B 5 wB)
iii. sR: xoA if yA 2 u xoA u $ yB 2 u xoB u and yA 2 u xoA u $ 0
xoB if yA 2 u xoA u , yB 2 u xoB u and yB 2 u xoB u $ 0
0 otherwise.
Consider the parts of Proposition 1 in reverse order. R’s strategy is clear. If she
chooses not to accept either offer from the interest groups, the best outcome that
she can obtain is to implement her ideal point, x 5 0, which will generate a
utility for R equal to zero. This therefore establishes her reservation value for
any offer made by one of the interest groups. Further, for every offer that B, the
smaller interest group, makes, A can beat it, since it has greater resources. To see
this, suppose B makes an offer of x and offers R all of its endowment wB. A
can always beat that offer by offering wA and an x that is (slightly) closer to xA
than B’s offer. As long as the policy offer is not “too far” from B’s offer in its
distance from zero the regulator will accept it. Since B can never win, it will
20. Note that we assume in the case of a “tie” that Rwill choose the policy of the largest lobbyist. This assumption
is justi ed because, as will be noted in the proof, the smaller player simply constrains the largest player by
his best offer—he can do no more. So the larger player can always move his policy-offer an « amount toward
zero, making his offer the one R accepts.
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FIGURE 2. Equilibrium to the lobbying game.
make the best offer it can to R in order to temper A’s offer. What is that offer?
In this case, it is all of its endowment and a policy of 0. Given this offer by B,
A will use all of its resources in excess of wB to pull the policy back toward her
own ideal point. In particular (see Figure 2), it will make a policy offer of
wA 2 wB, which, when combined with a transfer of its full endowment will be
equivalent to B’s offer to the regulator. Finally, it will always be in both players’
interests to use their full endowment; since they get no (dis)utility from spending
their full endowment, it is a weakly dominant strategy to spend all of it.
Proposition 1 contains a number of important features of the process of
(vote-buying) lobbying. First, the larger player’s offer, in this case A’s, is always
accepted. The reason for this is precisely the explanation of the equilibrium
solution above: the larger player can always outspend the smaller player and get
a better outcome than he could either in the absence of lobbying or under B’s
best offer. So the availability of vote-buying biases policy outcomes toward the
larger player (in other words, x* . 0).
Second, despite this bias, the smaller player plays an important role. By
making her best offer, the smaller player puts a bound on how far the larger
player can go in requesting policy. In this sense, B’s offer puts a constraint on
A’s offer and thus replaces the constraint of R’s reservation level. Notably, the
smaller the difference in endowments—in other words, as the relative size of A
versus B decreases, the closer equilibrium policy outcomes x* move toward zero.
This is easily shown since x* 5 xAo* 5 wA 2 wB, which implies
­ x*/ ­ (wA 2 wB) 5 1 . 0.
Similarly, the equilibrium policy outcome is continuous in the difference in
endowments. As the difference gets larger, the policy becomes more and more
positive.21
21. In this sense, the outcome has a similar property to Tullock’s rent-seeking model and its variants. However,
the method of obtaining such a result is different here. In Tullock’s (1980) model, each player can affect the
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Third, the regulator is strictly better off by the existence of a second group.
To see this compare R’s utility with and without the presence of a second interest
group (or alternatively, if wB 5 0). In this case, x* 5 wA Þ U*R 5 2 wA 1 wA 5 0.
When wB . 0, the regulator’s utility is UR 5 2 (wA2 wB) 1 wA 5 wB . 0. Further,
the degree to which she is better off is increasing in the size of the smaller
group: as the groups become more balanced, R’s rents go up linearly. In this
sense, the lobbying model has the same property seen in other models of
competitive lobbying in which the existence of (strong) competitive groups,
irrespective of the policy position of R, generates rents for the regulator.22
3. The effects of litigation on lobbying and policies
The lobbying game gives a simple understanding of how competitive vote-
buying operates. Using these results, we turn to an analysis of the effects that
litigation, or at least the existence of an opportunity for parties to litigate, has on
the allocation of resources to lobbying and equilibrium policy outcomes.
In order to conduct this analysis, we append the litigation game to the
lobbying game. The players and their preferences are identical to those in the
lobbying game, except that we add a nonstrategic player, the courts. We make
two primary assumptions about how litigation operates. First, if the policy
produced at the lobbying stage is overturned by the courts, the  nal policy
outcome is the court’s reversion point, which in many cases can be interpreted
to be the status quo. This feature, a standard assumption in much of the formal
literature on the courts,23 captures the nature of many classes of litigation
outcomes.24 Second, following our earlier explication of the empirical analysis
on winners and losers in the courts, we assume that the outcome at the litigation
stage is (somewhat) dependent on the resources that groups spend at that stage.
We think of this not as judge-bribing , but more as the quality and quantity of
legal resources acquired. For example, more money translates into better expert
witnesses and better lawyers.
The sequence of play in the litigation game is summarized in Figure 3. After
the lobbying game, each of the interest groups has an option to initiate litigation.
Footnote continued
probability of obtaining the rents, whereas in this case, there is no uncertainty—the result is generated by
the structure of the auction in the game: a single offer which is take-it-or-leave-it. The model also shares the
continuity property with Snyder (1991) in which he shows how vote-buying cartels can in uence policy
outcomes. Again, Snyder’s model is more general in that he develops the models using a distribution of voters
on a continuum.
22. See, for example, de Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo (1999); Austen-Smith and Wright (1992); Lupia
and McCubbins (1994).
23. See, for example, Canes (1998), Eskridge and Ferejohn (1994), and Ferejohn and Shipan (1989).
24. For example, in telecommunications , the FCC is issuing a series of nonadjudicatory general orders about entry
of local companies into long distance. The entry variable is dichotomous. De Figueiredo (1997) examines
the telecommunication s sector and  nds that many cases have dichotomous , mutually exclusive outcomes.
For example, in adjudication, the Federal Communications Commission makes a ruling as to who will be
awarded the license. The court can then uphold the FCC or overturn the FCC. It is extremely dif cult (and
never in fact the case) for the license to be split among two or more corporations. This represents 50 percent
of FCC litigated cases. Canes (1998)  nds similar circumstances at the Environmental Protection Agency in
permits for development in wetlands.
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FIGURE 3. Sequence of play in the litigation game.
Their choice is indicated by the indicator variable kiP {0,1}, where ki 5 1 if
litigation is initiated and zero otherwise. Next, both interest groups simul-
taneously choose an amount of resources zi to spend on litigation, subject to the
constraint that they cannot spend more than the remainder of their endowment
after the lobbying stage, i.e., zi # wi 2 yi. We use yi here to indicate accepted
transfers; where yi 5 0 means no transfers have taken place.
In the next move, the court decides to either overturn the decision of the
regulator, in which case the policy implemented reverts to the status quo, qPR,
or to uphold the regulation, in which case the outcome is xp.25 We assume this
probability is weakly increasing in the net amount of resources expended on
litigation by the groups. To provide analytic clarity, we model this assumption
by positing that the probability that the court overturns the decision is
F(a 1 b(zi 2 zj)) where F(.) is the standard normal cumulative density function,
zi is the amount of resources spent by the initiator to defend the status quo, zj
is the amount of resources spend by the other group to defend xp, a is a measure
of the “bias” of the court toward the status quo, and b $ 0 is a measure of the
responsiveness of the court to resources. After the choice by the court, the  nal
policy is implemented, transfers are effected, and payoffs made.
A number of points are worth noting about this speci cation for the role of
the courts. First, the courts in our model can be interpreted as “political.” In
traditional positive political theory models of the courts, courts are motivated by
policy outcomes.26 As a veto point, they can act on these preferences by
imposing the status quo as a reversion point if the policy passed in earlier
policymaking stages makes them worse off. In these models, therefore, there is
a constrained set of outcomes (which is the set of policies that the courts prefer
to the status quo) that are feasible in the earlier policymaking stages. Players will
optimize the choice of policy within this constrained set. In our model, the courts
can also be interpreted as having policy preferences. In this case, the underlying
probability that the court will uphold the status quo represents the degree of
“bias” in favor of existing policy modeled by the parameter a. Thus, our model
is similar to the traditional models in that the status quo bias of the court
constrains the set of policy choices in rulemaking. There are, however, some
important differences. First, unlike previous models, we do not make this status
quo bias a function of the policy choice at the rulemaking stage; in other words,
25. Although we call this point a status quo, and will follow that line of description throughout the ensuing
discussion, in fact, this point more generally would represent the court’s reversion point. In many cases, the
courts will have both formal and practical dif culty implementing any other point (in other words, they make
their ruling under a “closed” rule), so the status quo interpretation seems most natural.
26. See, for example, Tiller (1998); Tiller and Spiller (1999).
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a is not a function of x. While this would complicate the analysis substantially ,
it would not change the substantive results we outline later. Second, our model
is a more  exible, and perhaps more intuitive, way to analyze the courts.
Because a measures the predisposition of the court to the status quo, it does not
limit the court to a rent-seeking veto player but allows one to model the courts
as an actor that responds to the quality and intensity of the legal arguments.
A second important, and related, point is that although we model the courts
as nonstrategic, an alternative interpretation is that the courts are acting strategi-
cally, but that their preferences are unknown.27 In this interpretation, a strategic
court will act deterministically based on the outcome of the rulemaking stage: it
will only overturn policies which make it worse off than the status quo. But the
location of the courts will be uncertain to players moving earlier. Thus, the other
players’ expectations about the future move of the court will depend on their
beliefs about the location of the court.28 In this manner, when combined with the
previous point, our speci cation of the lobbying-litigatio n game can be seen as
one in which there are political and strategic courts, but in which the courts’
precise preferences are not known to either interest groups or regulators.
A third important point is that in many cases of administrative rulemaking, the
regulator has the option to “keep the gates closed.” In other words, if they are
fearful that the courts will lead them to a worse outcome, they can choose not
to allow the courts to rule on any policy by simply making no change.29 In our
model, the regulator has to choose a policy, meaning that, strictly speaking, there
is no gatekeeping power. However, since the regulator can never do worse than
the status quo—in other words, since the court can at worst implement the status
quo—the regulator (and the winning interest group) will never be worse off than
the status quo and would, even if given a choice of gatekeeping, never keep the
gates closed.
Finally, in the setup of our model, the resources spent at the litigation stage
are by the interest groups. In practice, however, the government agency is the
defendant when a group that has standing initiates litigation against the agency
ruling. This means that when litigation is possible , part of the transfer goes via
the agency, as a subsidy or tax by the agency in anticipation of litigation. This
interpretation introduces a complication, since the amount of resources the
agency will want to expend on defending the new rule might be different than
the optimal choice by the interest group that wins at the lobbying stage. This
problem, however, is obviated in our assumption that the agency is able to
commit to actions (both policies and litigation strategies) after the lobbying
stage.
To begin our analysis of the game, consider  rst the litigation stage. A player
will initiate litigation if and only if, after the lobbying stage, they are made better
27. The traditional models tend to assume that there is perfect information about judicial preferences.
28. That a court’s exact status quo bias is unknown could be generated by a number of real-world aspects of the
process including panel selection, issue-speci c preferences of judges, and temporal shocks to preferences.
29. This is not always the case. In many cases, Congress speci cally requires that an administrative agency
determine a rule. The well-documented case in which Congress required the FCC to establish a standard for
the automation and integration of household electronic devices under the 1992 Cable Act is a prime example
(Baron, 1994).
170 Brought to you by | Duke University
Authenticated | 152.3.128.54
Download Date | 9/13/12 3:35 PM
The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups
off if the status quo prevails as the  nal outcome x. Thus a player will initiate
litigation when
u q 2 xiu , u xp 2 xiu iP {A, B}
Further, if qP [xB, xA], one of the two players will initiate litigation and will use
all of her remaining sources to defend xp while the other player will conversely
spend all of her remaining sources to defend xp. The reason is that no matter
what the choice of the regulator, one side is always better off with the status quo.
We formalize this logic in Lemma 1.
LEMMA 1. Suppose qP [xB, xA], xpP [xB, xA], then if xp . q, B will initiate
litigation , use all of her remaining resources wB 2 yB to overturn the new policy
xp, and A will use all of her remaining resources wA 2 yA to defend the new
policy. If xp # q, A will initiate litigation otherwise, A will use all of her
remaining resources to overturn the new policy and B will use all of her
remaining resources to defend the new policy.
Now we turn to analysis of the equilibrium. To simplify the analysis and capture
basic intuitions , we analyze perhaps the most interesting case in which ex ante
lobbying policy power is given to the disadvantaged group. In particular, we
assume qP (xB, 0) and wB 5 0. The former assumption simply states that the
status quo is on the smaller players’ side of the regulator, which means we can
directly address the conditions under which the political disadvantage theory is
most relevant. The second simply means that the smaller players’ only recourse
is to litigation, again, consistent with the political disadvantage theory. In this
case, by Lemma 1, B is always the plaintiff in the litigation stage.
LEMMA 2. Suppose qP (xB, 0) and wB 5 0, then xoA > 0, xp > 0, and B will always
litigate in equilibrium.
Lemma 2 states that policy offers from A and the policy outcome during the
lobbying stage will always be weakly to A’s side of R. To see this, note that B
will never be able to offer R a policy that R will accept since B has no resources
to offer in exchange. Thus, to simplify the notation, from now on we drop the
subscripts on xoA, wA, and yA. Next, notice that R will always be better off from
a lottery over zero and q, rather than a lottery over any other x and q, so even
if R rejects A’s offer, R will implement zero. As before, then, this strategy
conditions A’s strategy. Consider  rst whether A will ever offer xo , 0. Given
Lemmas 1 and 2, one of the players will always have an incentive to litigate, so
A will always be better off saving her resources to at least defend zero rather
than spending resources to get R to move closer to xA. If A does make an offer,
therefore, it will always be one which makes her better off than zero. Thus, in
equilibrium, lobbying results will again always be biased toward the larger
group.
Given this result, it is possible to analyze the outcomes of the lobbying game.
Consider  rst the regulator’s strategy. R will accept an offer from A o 5 (xo, y) if
and only if:
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F(a 1 b(y 2 w))q2 (12 F(a 1 b(y 2 w)))xo 1 y . F(a 2 bw)q. (2a)30
If R accepts A’s offer, her expected payoff is the quantity on the left-hand
side of (2a). The  rst term is the probability that the new policy will be
overturned multiplied by the disutility to R of the status quo. The second term
is the probability that the new policy will be upheld multiplied by the disutility
suffered by R from the policy implemented in the lobbying stage. Note that
both of these probabilities are a function of the transfers in the lobbying stage.
The third term is simply the transfers A makes to R if R accepts A’s offer.
The right-hand side is the expected utility for R if she rejects A’s proposal: she
obtains the status quo with some (smaller) probability and otherwise gets her
ideal point. (2a) can be rewritten:
y . (F0 2 F1)q 1 (1 2 F1)xo (2b)
where F1 5 F(a 1 b(y 2 w)) and F0 5 F(a 2 bw). So R will accept the offer only
if the bene t she gets from the transfer outweighs two types of cost. On the one
hand, by accepting y the chance that the outcome will be q increases. On the
other hand, the offer that A makes to R will also be weakly worse (by Lemma
2), and thus imposes a cost on R if she accepts the offer.
Given this result, we can write down A’s problem at the lobbying stage:
maxF1(q2 xA) 1 (12 F1)(xo 2 xA) (3)
y, xo
s.t. (i) y . (F02 F1)q 1 (1 2 F1)xo
(ii) 0 # xo # xA
(iii) 0 # y # w
A chooses her offer maximizing the expected utility subject to R’s acceptance.31
If R will not accept an offer that makes A better off than no transfer and xp 5 0,
then A will simply offer nothing and no exchange will take place. Solving this
maximization problem for an interior solution, we have:
PROPOSITION 2. If the wealth differential between A and B is not too large, and
C is suf ciently responsive to resources, then the following constitute equilib-
rium policy offers, proposals and regulation in the lobbying stage:
(i) sR: Reject oB
Accept oA if y . (F0 2 F1)q 1 (1 2 F1)xo
0 otherwise
(ii) SB: oB 5 (xoB , 0, yB 5 0)




b Ï log k
2
xo 5
(F3 2 F2)q2 a/b 2 1/b Ï log k2 1 w
12 F3
30. It is worth noting that (2a) is written using the fact that the negation of the absolute value of a negative number
k is simply k. So 2 F(a 1 b(y 2 w)) u q u 2 (1 2 F(a 1 b(y 2 w))) u xo u 1 y . 2 F(a 2 bw) u qu can be written as in
(2a) using the fact that q , 0 and xo 1 y . 0.
31. Note that " a , b, u a 2 b u 5 b 2 a.
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where k 5 2qb/ Ï 2p, F3 5 F ( 2 Ï log k2), and F2 5 F(a 2 bwA). Further, an
equilibrium policy outcome from the lobbying stage will be x*p 5 xo*.32
We begin our interpretation of this equilibrium by  rst commenting on the
conditions . The court’s suf cient responsiveness guarantees that the equilibrium
solutions will be real-valued. The wealth differential not being too large
guarantees an interior solution. In other words, relative to the extremity of the
group and the reversion point, the group’s endowment is not overwhelming. It
also implies that there must be a suf ciently large chance that the court will
overturn the outcome of the lobbying stage (i.e., a cannot be “too small”). The
proof in the appendix lays out these conditions more formally.
The equilibrium stated in Proposition 2 has a number of implications for the
nature of lobbying in the shadow of litigation. First, the existence of litigation
can bias the outcome of lobbying either closer to or farther from the winning
group, depending on the parameter values. The reason for this is that the
existence of litigation has two effects on the policy and transfer offers that A
makes. The  rst effect is that litigation relaxes the constraint that R’s reversion
point places on the interest group. Whereas in the pure lobbying game the
regulator knows she will obtain a  nal policy outcome of zero with certainty,
with litigation, even if she rejects A’s offer, the best she can obtain is a lottery
over zero and q. Thus, by passing regulation that will be less favorable, she only
bears part of the cost of the unfavorable policy (because this policy occurs only
probabilistically) , whereas she obtains the transfer in the same amount as before
(with certainty).33 This allows the interest group to demand a more favorable
policy than in the absence of the chance of overturning the regulation. However,
the second effect is driven by the fact that the probability of obtaining the court’s
reversion point is a function of the amount of resources A has left, thus both R
and A have incentives to encourage A to conserve resources to defend against the
court’s reversion point in the litigation phase. The more of her endowment that
the lobbyist transfers to the regulator at the lobbying stage, the more likely it is
that the  nal outcome will be the court’s reversion point, and the lobbying
efforts will be wasted. So the lobbyist has an incentive to save money and offer
less. Similarly, even if the lobbyist has a strong incentive to transfer a large
portion of his endowment to the regulator, the regulator, depending on the
extremity of the court’s reversion point, might also not want the lobbyist to do
so, since she also obtains a positive externality in the litigation stage from the
remainder of the lobbyist’s endowment—the more of it that is left, the greater
the chance that the outcome of the regulation stage will stand.
32. Note that the equilibrium explicated here is not necessarily unique.
33. To see this more clearly, consider a one-interest group lobbying game analogous to the form in Section 2
(i.e., w , u x u , x . 0) in which there is some  xed probability g that the regulation will be overturned and result
in q , 0. In this case, we can write the interest group’s problem as
max(q 2 x) 1 (1 2 g)(xo 2 x) s.t. (i) 2 (1 2 g)xo 1 y . 0 (ii) y # w
o,y
which has the unique solution in which the group will offer to transfer all of its endowment in exchange for a
policy of w/(1 2 g) if w/(1 2 g) , x and x otherwise, and its offer will be accepted. Notice that the equilibrium
policy in this case is strictly higher (and therefore closer to the group’s ideal point) than in the absence of
litigation.
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In terms of the equilibrium policy that the regulator passes, then, this
downward pressure on the transfer also puts downward pressure on the lobby-
ist’s policy offer, since the smaller the transfer, the less extreme a policy the
regulator is willing to give in exchange. So, whereas the existence of some
probability of overturning the regulation relaxes the constraint on the policy
proposal that the lobbyist can make for a given transfer, the incentive of both the
lobbyist and regulator to save resources for the litigation phase puts downward
pressure on the transfer and therefore the policy offer that the lobbyist can make.
The  rst implication is that the net of these two effects—whether the  nal policy
outcome from the lobbying stage is closer or farther from the lobbyist’s ideal
point in comparison to the game in the absence of litigation—depends on the
other parameter values, which we now consider.34
The next set of related results examines the comparative statics of the
equilibrium transfer and policy. To analyze these comparative statics, we  rst
employ the following result.
COROLLARY 1. Suppose qP (xB, 0) and wB 5 0, and conditions (i) and (ii) of
Proposition 2 hold, if y* increases, xo* increases.
The logic of this result is straightforward. Fixing all of the parameter values,
anything that increases the equilibrium offer will allow the lobbyist to demand
a higher (better) policy at the lobbying stage.
Using Corollary 1, then, we derive a second implication of Proposition 2: as the
court’s reversion point becomes more extreme, the transfer made in the lobbying
stage is smaller, and therefore the regulation passed moves away from the
lobbyist. To see this, consider the  rst derivatives of y* and xo* with respect to q:
­ y*/ ­ q 5 2 1/(bq Ï log k2 ) . 0 Þ ­ xo*/­ q . 0.
Consider the effect of q on the proposals that the lobbyist can make. If q is
extreme, then the lobbyist wants to save resources to defend against the court’s
reversion point. Similarly, the regulator also wants the lobbyist to save resources
to defend against a more extreme court’s reversion point. In this case, the
lobbyist will not transfer as much to the regulator and then, by Corollary 1, will
not be able to obtain as favorable regulation.
A third implication of Proposition 2 is that as the endowed interest group’s
resources increase, the transfers are higher and the outcome of the lobbying
stage is closer to her ideal point. Again, consider the  rst derivatives of y* and
xo* with respect to the parameter w. Here, we have:
­ y*/ ­ w 5 1 Þ ­ xo*/ ­ w . 0.
Again, the logic is straightforward: as the interest group gets larger and larger, it
is relatively more able to transfer resources to the regulator without sacri cing the
bene t of saving. It is not the case that it will transfer all incremental resources;
part will go toward improving its position in the lobbying stage and part will be
conserved in order to resist the court’s reversion point in the litigation stage.
34. In expectation, even if the lobbying policy goes up, the expected nal policy might make the smaller group
better off in comparison to the case when litigation is unavailable.
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A fourth implication of Proposition 2 is that as the underlying probability that
the court will overturn the decision increases, the transfers decrease, and there-
fore lobbying outcomes are driven toward non-results. In the extreme, as this
probability increases, it can lead to the elimination of lobbying altogether. Again,
consider the  rst derivatives of y* and xo* with respect to the parameter a:
­ y*/ ­ a 5 2 1/b Þ ­ xo*/ ­ a , 0.
Here the logic is not as straightforward. If the probability of a court
overturning an agency is higher, why would that affect the outcome at the
lobbying stage? The answer can best be seen by considering how the probability
of obtaining the court’s reversion point responds to changes in y as a increases.
When a increases, it becomes increasingly costly for both the lobbyist and the
regulator—in terms of the probability that the new policy will be overturned—
for the lobbyist to transfer y to the regulator. This effect outweighs the effect of
relaxation of R’s reservation constraint since it enters linearly. As the “locus” of
the distribution shifts downward, the transfers and the policies proposed by the
regulator tend toward zero—in other words, in the extreme, the existence of
litigation can completely eliminate lobbying if the underlying probability of the
regulation being overturned is suf ciently high.
A  nal implication of Proposition 2 is that the equilibrium transfers and
policy can be nonlinear in b (the responsiveness of the courts to resources)
depending on a. Recall that when b is high, the courts are more responsive to
resources than when b is low. That is, when b is very high, the probability of
being overturned changes quickly from almost zero to almost one. When b is
low, the policy responds very little, and the probability is essentially independent
of resources. When b is somewhere in between, it rises regularly in a more linear
fashion. The effect of this pattern of responsiveness on the equilibrium can be
seen by examining the  rst derivatives of y* and xo*:
­ y*/ ­ b 5 (1/b2)(log k2 1 a Ï log k2 2 1) >< 0 Þ ­ xo*/ ­ b >< 0.
Here it is clear that the effect of b on the equilibrium transfers and policy
depends on a. Figure 4 illustrates, for two different values of a, the comparative
FIGURE 4. Effect of b on equilibrium offers.
175Brought to you by | Duke University
Authenticated | 152.3.128.54
Download Date | 9/13/12 3:35 PM
John M. & Rui J.P. de Figueiredo
statics of y* and xo* with respect to b. When a is very low, the equilibrium
transfers as b increases will be muted until b becomes very large (in other
words, y* will be convex in b). Alternatively, when a is large, as the courts
become increasingly responsive to resources, y* and xo* become more and more
extreme. The reason for this is that as b increases, it “pulls out” the area in
which the probability of being overturned is very low and therefore relaxes the
concern that the lobbyist and the regulator have about risking increasing chances
of the court’s reversion point with more spending.
Finally, it is worthwile considering an extension to the model: the effects of
delay. An important strategy for a losing interest group is to initiate legal
action—even if it knows it might eventually lose—in order to delay the
implementation of a new policy that is less favorable to the group than the status
quo. Indeed, this strategy interacts with the resource aspects of litigation
strategies, as plaintiffs that are more resource-rich will likely be able to delay the
implementation longer than those groups which are resource-poor. If this is the
case, what effect would the opportunity to delay have on the model we examine?
In this case, if litigation is used in part to delay, it will only complement our
results in the same direction already obtained. Because the groups will still treat
lobbying and litigation as partial substitutes : money will be conserved at the
lobbying stage to obtain faster (slower) results at the litigation stage.35 In this
sense, then, our results will still hold in the extreme case in which there is no
uncertainty about the  nal outcome of litigation but net resources affect the
timing of the decision.
These results illustrate that, under certain conditions , litigation can have a
dramatic effect on lobbying in cases when the court’s reversion point favors a
smaller group—the focus of the political disadvantage theory. Our model points
out that results from both the positive literature on vote-buying and the political
disadvantage theory have to be quali ed; based on the characteristics of the
courts’ decision making, the existence of litigation dramatically alters the nature
of lobbying in the earlier stages.
4. Conclusion
Although scholars have examined lobbying and litigation in isolation, we have
developed a theory to take account of the linkages between the regulatory and
litigatory strategies by interest groups. In developing this integrated theory, the
paper demonstrates not only how resource-responsive courts introduce a depen-
dence between lobbying and litigation strategies, but also provides explicit
conditions under which such strategies will be pursued, and how those strategies
in uence both intermediate and  nal outcomes in the policy process. We develop
a model that explains how competing interest groups lobby for policy in the
absence of litigation. Then we show that by permitting litigation of regulatory
rules, as is common in the United States, lobbying strategies are changed. We
show that courts, even if relatively inactive, can have a profound effect on the
35. While a detailed formalization of this point is beyond the scope of this paper, such a model is available from
the authors.
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amount of lobbying that occurs. In particular, we demonstrate that (1) as the
court’s reversion point becomes more extreme, the transfer made in the lobbying
stage will be smaller; (2) as the endowed interest group’s resources increase, the
transfers are higher and the outcome of the lobbying stage is closer to its ideal
point; (3) as the underlying probability that the court will overturn the decision
increases, the transfers to the regulator decreases, and therefore lobbying
outcomes are driven toward non-results—which may eliminate lobbying alto-
gether; and (4) as the responsiveness of the court to resources changes, the effect
it has on lobbying will depend upon the ideology of the court. The theory, thus,
provides insights and quali cations to the existing literatures on interest groups,
lobbying, legal challenges, political disadvantage, and nonmarket strategy, and
provides testable hypotheses to guide empirical work in this area.
This theory may also have implications for our understanding of comparative
institutions . In some countries, such as the United States, courts have high
powers of review over administrative agencies. In many other countries, courts
have minimal review powers over administrative agencies. Thus, the lobbying
game, without the litigation game, may re ect a better understanding of lobbying
in these countries. Finally, there are a number of countries, transition countries
in particular, that are dealing with the development of their institutions . This
model may help to shed on light of the impact of different designs of
governmental institutions in these nations. Overall, this paper explains how the
mere threat of litigation can affect the lobbying behavior of interest groups in
bureaucracies.
Appendix: proofs of results
Proof of Proposition 1. Using backward induction,  rst consider R’s strategy. In
this case,  rst solve for x* in the case that R rejects both oA and oB. In this case,
R’s problem reduces to
x* 5 argmax 2 u x u (A1.1)
x
which is simply x* 5 0. Thus, R will choose from the set {oA, oB, (0, 0)}, by
choosing the pair that maximizes her (expected) utility, which is precisely the
conditions stated in (iii). Next, note that offering yi 5 wi is a weakly dominant
strategy for both A and B since y is not an element of either player’s utility
function. Next, for any offer oB, A can offer a pair that makes R better off, since
wA . wB. If B’s offer satis es the constraint in (iii), then it is straightforward to
show that A’s best response is oA 5 (xoB 1 wA 2 wB, wA). Given this response
function, B’s best response is to choose xoB to maximize xB 2 xoB 2 wA 1 wB which
occurs at zero. This implies that o*B 5 (0, wB). Substituting this into A’s best
response function implies o*A 5 (wA 2 wB, wA).
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider  rst if xp . q. If there is no litigation, A will
be better off since 2 u xp 2 xA u . 2 u q 2 x A u , so A will not litigate. If there is
litigation, however, A will spend all remaining resources to defend the new
policy since there is no cost to zA and F is decreasing in resources spent by
defendants in the litigation stage. On the other hand, B will be worse off if there
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is no litigation since 2 u xp 2 xB u , 2 u q 2 xBu . By a similar argument for A, B will
therefore spend all resources to overturn the new policy. The same logic holds
if A is substituted for B and vice versa.
Proof of Lemma 2. The  rst part follows from Proposition 1, by noting that
adding the courts simply linearly transforms A’s choice problem when B has no
resources. The second part follows from q , 0 and the  rst part of the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the problem given in (3).
Suppose qP (xB, 0) and wB 5 0, and the following two conditions are satis ed:
(i) (F0 2 F1)q 1 a/b 1 (1/b) Ï log k2 1 xA(1 2 F1) . w . (F0 2 F1)q 1 a/b
1 (1/b) Ï log k2 . 0
(ii) b . Ï 2p/2q
When constraints (ii) and (iii) do not bind, the  rst-order conditions for the
Lagrangian are:
y: 2 F 91(x 2 q) 1 F 91(x 2 p) 1 lF 91q 1 lF 91p 1 l (A1.2)
xo:(1 2 F1) 2 l(1 2 F1) (A1.3)
l:F1q 2 (1 2 F1)xo 1 y 2 F0q (A1.4)
where F 91 5 ­ F1/ ­ y. (A1.3) implies
l 5 1
Substituting this result into (A1.2), we have
F 91 5 2 1/(2q).
Substituting for F 91, we have
b / (a 1 b(y 2 w)) 5 2 1/(2q)
where / () is the probability density function for a standard normal random
variable. This can be rewritten
b(1/ Ï 2p)e 2 (1/2)(a 1 b(y 2 w))2 5 2 1/(2q).
Taking the logarithms of both sides we have:
2 1/2(a 1 b(y 2 w))2 5 log( 2 Ï 2p/(2bq)) (A1.5)
Letting k 5 (2bq)/ Ï 2p, we can rewrite (A1.5)
(a 1 b(y 2 w))2 5 log k2. (A1.6)
Solving for the roots of (A1.6), we have:
a 1 b(y 2 w) 5 6 Ï (log k2). (A1.7)
Note that since b . Ï 2p/2q, the right hand side of (A1.7) is real-valued, which
is condition (ii) in the proposition . Taking the negative root, and solving for y,
we have the  rst part of the proposition :
y* 5 2 a/b 2 (1/b) Ï log k2 1 w
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Substituting y* into Eq. (A1.4) and solving for xo yields
xo* 5 ((F1 2 F0)q 2 (a/b) 2 (1/b)(log k2))/(1 2 F1).
Imposing constraints (ii) and (iii) on y* and xo* and solving for w yields
condition (i) in the proposition .
Proof of Corollary 1. By the Chain Rule, it is suf cient to show that ­ xo/ ­ y . 0.
Taking the derivative, we have:
­ xo/ ­ y 5 ((1 2 F0)b / 1q 1 (1 2 F1) 1 b / 1y)/(1 2 F1)2
which is positive by condition (i) in Proposition 2.
Acknowledgements
The authors are indebted to Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tim Groseclose, Robert
Kagan, Eric Rasmussen, James Snyder, Pablo Spiller, Emerson Tiller and
Andrew von Norden ycht for helpful comments and suggestions . We would also
like to thank seminar participants at Harvard University, the University of
California Berkeley Conference on Non-Market Strategy, the American Political
Science Association and the American Law and Economics Association. Any
 aws are solely the fault of the authors.
References
Ainsworth, Scott. 1993. “Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group In uence.” Journal of Politics 55: 41–56.
Arnold, Douglas. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Austen-Smith, David 1993. “Information and In uence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes.” American Journal
of Political Science 37: 799–834
Austen-Smith, David 1995. “Campaign Contributions and Access.” American Political Science Review 89:
566–581.
Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. 1992. “Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator’s Vote.” Social
Choice and Welfare 9: 229–257.
Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. 1994. “Counteractive Lobbying.” American Journal of Political
Science 38: 25–44.
Banks, Jeffrey S. 1989. “Agency Budgets, Cost Information and Auditing.” American Journal of Political
Science 33: 670–699.
Banks, Jeffrey S. and Barry R. Weingast. 1992. “The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric
Information.” American Journal of Political Science 36: 509–524.
Baron, David P. 1994. Business and its Environment, 2nd Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Baron, David P. 1996. “The Non-Market Strategy System.” Sloan Management Review 37: 73–85.
Baron, David P. 1999. “Integrated Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Client and Interest Group Politics.”
Business and Politics 1: 1–41.
Becker, Gary S. 1983. “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political In uence.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 98: 371–400.
Bendor, Jonathan and Terry M. Moe. 1986. “Agenda Control, Committee Capture, and the Dynamics of
Institutional Politics.” American Political Science Review 80: 1187–1207.
Caldeira, Gregory A. and John R. Wright. 1998. “Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court
Nominations, and United States Senate.” American Journal of Political Science 42: 499–523.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 1998. “Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts.” Depart-
ment of Political Science Working Paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Cohen, Linda and Matthew Spitzer. 1994. “Solving the Chevron Puzzle.” Law and Contemporary Problems
57: 67–110.
179Brought to you by | Duke University
Authenticated | 152.3.128.54
Download Date | 9/13/12 3:35 PM
John M. & Rui J.P. de Figueiredo
Cortner, Richard C. 1968. “Strategies and Tactics of Litigants in Constitutional Cases.” Journal of Public Law
17: 287–307.
Cross, Frank B. and Emerson H. Tiller. 1998. “Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeal.” Yale Law Journal 107: 2155–2176.
de Figueiredo, John M. 1997. “The Politics of the Court and the Strategy of the Firm,” Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of California, Berkeley Haas School of Business.
de Figueiredo, John M. and Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. 2002. “Managerial Decision-Making in Non-Market
Environments: A Survey Experiment.” Advances in Strategic Management 19: 67–96.
de Figueiredo, Rui J. P., Jr., Pablo Spiller, and Urbiztondo 1999. “An Informational Perspective on
Administrative Procedures.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15: 283–305.
Epstein, Lee (1985). Conservatives in Court. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press.
Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. 1995. “Positive Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making,” Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
Ferejohn, John A. and Charles F. Shipan. 1989. “Congressional In uence on the Bureaucracy. ” Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 6: 1–27.
Galatner, Marc. 1974. “Why Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Social Change.” Law and
Society Review 9: 95–160.
Grier, Kevin B., Michael C. Munger and Brian E. Roberts. 1994. “The Determinants of Industry Political
Activity, 1978–1986.” American Political Science Review 88: 911–926.
Groseclose, Timothy. 1996. “An Examination of the Markets for Favors and Votes in Congress.” Economic
Inquiry.
Groseclose, Timothy and James Snyder. 1996. “Buying Supermajorities.” American Political Science Review,
90: 303–315.
Hansen, John Mark. 1991. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919–1981. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Herring, Pendleton. 1929. Group Representation Before Congress. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Kingdon, John W. 1981. Congressmen’s Voting Decision, rev. ed. New York: Harper & Row.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press.
Latham, Earl. 1952. “The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory.” American Political Science Review 46:
376–397.
Lowi, Theodore J. 1979. The End of Liberalism, 2nd Edition. New York: Norton.
Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1994. “Designing Bureaucratic Regulation.” Law and Contempor-
ary Problems 57: 91–126.
Marks, Brian. 1988. “A Model of Judicial In uence on Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v.
Bell.” Political Science Working Paper, P-88–7, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols v. Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science, 29: 721–749.
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger Noll and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. “Administrative Procedures as Instruments
of Political Control.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3: 243–277.
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger Noll and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies.” Virginia Law Review 75: 431–482.
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger Noll and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. “Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation.” Law and Contemporary Problems 57: 3–37.
McGuire, Kevin T., and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1993. “Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity:
Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court.” American Political Science Review 87: 717–726.
Milbraith, Lester W. 1963. The Washington lobbyists. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Olson, Susan. 1990. “Interest Group Litigation in Federal District Court: Beyond Political Disadvantage
Theory.” Journal of Politics 52: 854–882.
Peltzman, Samuel. 1976. “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.” Journal of Law and Economics 19:
211–240.
Riker, William H. and Barry R. Weingast. 1986. “The Political and Economic Consequences of Judicial
Deference to Legislatures.” Mimeo, Washington University-St. Louis.
Rubin, Paul H., Christopher Curran and John F. Curran. 1999. “Litigation versus Legislation: Forum Shopping
by Rent-Seekers.” Public Choice 57: 295–310.
180 Brought to you by | Duke University
Authenticated | 152.3.128.54
Download Date | 9/13/12 3:35 PM
The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups
Schwartz, Edward P., Pablo T. Spiller and Santiago Urbiztondo. 1994. “A Positive Theory of Legislative
Intent.” Law and Contemporary Problems 57: 51–74.
Segal, Jeffrey A. 1997. “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and the Courts.”
American Political Science Review 91: 28–44.
Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. 1993. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Snyder, James. 1990. “Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980–
1986.” Journal of Political Economy 98: 1195–1227.
Snyder, James. 1991. “On Buying Legislatures.” Economics and Politics 3: 93–109.
Snyder, James. 1992. “Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often.” Journal of Law &
Economics 35: 15–43.
Songer, Donald R. and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1992. “Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the
United States Courts of Appeals.” American Journal of Political Science 36: 235–258.
Spiller, Pablo T. 1992. “Agency Discretion Under Judicial Review.” Mathematical and Computer Modelling
16: 185.
Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely. 1992. “Congressional Control of Judicial Independence : The Determinants
of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949–1988.” Rand Journal of Economics 23: 463–492.
Spiller, Pablo T. and Matthew Spitzer. 1992. “Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines.” Journal of Law, Economics
and Organization 8: 8–46.
Stratmann, Thomas. 1992. “Are Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees.”
Journal of Political Economy 100: 647–664.
Stratmann, Thomas. 1998. “The market for congressiona l votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?”
Journal of Law & Economics 41: 85–113.
Stigler, George J. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics and Management
Science 2: 3–21.
Tiller, Emerson H. 1998. “Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial In uence on Regulatory
Decision Making.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 14: 114–135.
Tiller, Emerson H. and Pablo T. Spiller. 1999. “Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in
Administrative Law.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15: 349–377.
Truman, David. 1971. The Governmental Process, 2nd Edition. New York: Knopf.
Tullock, Gordon. 1980. “Ef cient Rent-Seeking.” In Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, edited by
James M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press.
Wheeler, Stanton, Bliss Cartwright, Robert Kagan and Lawrence Friedman. 1987. “Do the ‘Haves’ Come Out
Ahead? Winning and Losing in the State Supreme Courts, 1870–1970.” Law and Society Review 21:
403–445.
181Brought to you by | Duke University
Authenticated | 152.3.128.54
Download Date | 9/13/12 3:35 PM
